I. INTRODUCTION
R ELIABLE and efficient tools are needed for detecting the presence of hidden fissile materials at border checkpoints and during search operations. Passive means of inspection rely on the detection of the spontaneous decay products (mainly neutrons and photons) of fissile materials. This is a safe and simple method, however a low signal rate (especially for ) may preclude detection. Active methods involve a probing beam of neutrons or photons and the detection of characteristic particle emissions. In principle, any amount of shielding can be penetrated with adequate source strength, but at potentially high cost and complexity.
Here we describe an active system based on an interrogating beam of low-energy (60-keV) neutrons, which may induce fission in and , but not in and only weakly in [1] , [2] . The prompt fission neutrons have a typical energy of -and are synchronously detected and discriminated from the 60-keV source neutrons and associated photons. Hence the presence of high-energy neutrons correlated with the source provides a clear signature for SNM. The efficacy of the method strongly depends on the type and thickness of the shielding material. Hydrogenous cargo tends to moderate and absorb both the incident and outgoing neutrons, severely degrading the signal even for fairly thin shielding. Non-hydrogenous shielding on the other hand can be penetrated with ease while the escaping fission neutrons suffer only little energy degradation. 
II. NEUTRON SOURCE
The neutron source was custom designed and built by AccSys [3] , Inc., and is optimized for small weight and power consumption. At its heart lies a compact radiofrequency quadrupole (RFQ) that accelerates protons produced by an electron cyclotron resonance (ECR) source. Its specifications are summarized in Table I .
The reaction has a threshold of 1.88 MeV. Its cross section rises quickly and reaches a plateau of at 1.91 MeV. In the center-of-mass frame the neutron distribution is nearly isotropic near threshold, but strongly forward directed in the laboratory frame. There is no need for bulky side shielding in contrast to standard D-D and D-T neutron generators. Fig. 1 shows the calculated neutron angle-energy distribution using the tables published by Liskien et al. [4] . The target was assumed to be thick, meaning the ionization energy loss was . The thickness of the actual Li target was about twice that at 1 , deposited on a solid Ag backing (2 mm thick) for heat diffusion. A thin layer of Cr (1 ) was deposited on top of the Li for corrosion protection. After several hundred hours of running, we noticed substantial blistering of the target due to hydrogen gas build-up. We plan to remedy this in future with a sintered Ag backing to increase gas diffusion.
III. BACKGROUNDS
The 60-keV neutron generator also produces a small number of high-energy neutrons via proton capture on . important background source is followed by . Based on published cross sections [5] - [8] , we estimate a contamination of high-energy neutrons per low-energy neutron from above reactions. Both backgrounds are minimized by employing a Li layer that slows protons to just below the threshold. A natural background of high-energy neutrons is produced by interactions of solar and galactic protons and their secondaries in the atmosphere and on the ground. The flux depends on location and solar activity, a typical value is 30/ at sea level. With a pulsed neutron generator this background can be gated out to some extent.
A large number of gammas correlated with the generator is also present, mainly from and neutron capture reactions. Gammas may Compton scatter in the detector and masquerade as high-energy neutrons. This background can be minimized by detector segmentation to reduce pile-up, and the use of materials with good pulse-shape discrimination properties.
IV. EXPECTED SIGNAL
The cargo types that are most suitable to our interrogation method are composed of non-hydrogenous materials. Incident low-energy neutrons suffer only slight energy losses via elastic scattering which dominates the total cross section. Outgoing high-energy fission neutrons are down-scattered mostly by inelastic collisions at energies above the reaction threshold (typically around 1 MeV), and less efficient elastic collisions below it. In hydrogenous materials by contrast, both low-energy and high-energy neutrons are efficiently thermalized by elastic collisions with protons and tend to be captured. We performed a MCNP5 simulation of the neutron return signal from a 10 kg ball of shielded by various cargos. The container was modeled as a box, 2.5 m by 2.5 m by 6 m, filled uniformly with material of density 0. 4 . The generator was at 1 m from the box and pointing toward the uranium ball at the center. Table II shows the dramatic dependence of the return signal on the amount of hydrogen in the cargo. Adding a strong neutron absorber such as boron to the hydrogen further decreases the signal, but has little effect in non-hydrogenous materials.
V. DETECTOR HARDWARE
Our high-energy neutron detector consists of 96 cylindrical cells of xylene (Eljen EJ-301) scintillator with a total active area of 1 . Each cell (10 cm in diameter, 7.6 cm long) is viewed by a single phototube (Photonis XP53X2). The amplified signals are passed to both a digital (Struck VME) and an analog (Mesytec MPD-4) data acquisition system, which output decay time and total energy of each event for later analysis. Neutron and gammas events generally have different light decay curves that become more separated with increasing energy. We used a threshold of 80 keV of electron-equivalent energy, corresponding to a proton recoil energy of in xylene [9] . For these parameters, we estimate the gamma rejection factor to be of order [10] - [12] . Stilbene crystals were also considered for this project. They have superior particle discrimination properties, but are currently not available in large quantities.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We conducted a series of experiments with 376 g of placed in various cargos. The configurations were a pallet of steel pipes , a 60 cm thick steel casement , and a pallet of plywood . The neutron generator and the detector array were positioned on opposite sides of the test object. The plywood stack was approximately 120 cm thick, while the steel pipe stack was up to twice as thick. The position of the SNM sample in the plywood and steel pipe cargos was variable. The steel casement had a 10 cm void for placement of the SNM. The number of high-energy neutron counts for a 5 min. measurement time was typically 1000-2500 un-gated and about half that with the uncorrelated background removed. Using the tail of the time evolution plot to obtain a background count rate (cargo with 60-keV neutrons off), the presence of HEU can be detected in all five cases when a threshold of change between pulse on and tail count rates differ by 10% or more. Clearly, the detection of the HEU sample in plywood becomes marginal for thicknesses exceeding 30 , whereas it is still relatively straightforward to penetrate 200 of steel.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have developed and tested a shielded SNM detection technique that produces a clear positive signal in the presence of small quantities of . It is most suitable for thick and dense non-hydrogenous shielding. It is prompt and low dose, making it superior to methods involving the detection of delayed neutrons. It fails in scenarios where thick hydrogenous shielding is present. Other screening methods, such as measuring neutron or photon induced delayed gamma emission from fission products [13] , would be more suitable in those cases.
